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MARITAL AGREEMENTS IN SCOTLAND 
 
Kenneth McK. Norrie 
 
 
(I) Historical Introduction 
 
Property During Marriage 
The common law of Scotland originally imposed what looked like a community 
of property regime on married couples, analogous to the systems well-known 
throughout the ius commune  of western Europe,1 though in a form that in the 
modern period has been described as µextremely crude¶.2  It was not based on 
any partnership between the spouses, nor on a relationship involving equal 
shares and equal responsibilities  -  or even a division of shares and a division 
of responsibilities.  Rather it was a much more primitive system based on the 
KXVEDQG¶V absolute rights that he acquired on marriage DQG D ZRPDQ¶V
economic subservience, both elements of which were perceived as being part 
of the natural law (i.e. divinely ordained)3.  Together with the primogeniture 
rules of succession, the form of community of property pertaining in Scotland 
was an effective means of ensuring that control of property remained, as far 
as possible, within the male domain. 
 
The husband had two major rights.  First and most important was the 
ius mariti, by which all the moveable property held by a woman at the date of 
her marriage passed to her husband at its constitution; likewise all moveable 
property acquired by the woman during the subsistence of her marriage fell to 
                                            
1 Stair, Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1681) I, iv, 9 expressed it as µa community of 
goods betwixt the married persons¶.  6HHDOVR(UVNLQH¶VInstitute of the Law of Scotland 
,YLDQG%HOO¶VPrinciples of the Law of Scotland (1829) para 1549. 
2 A. Anton, µThe Effects of Marriage Upon Property in Scots Law¶ (1956) 19 Modern Law 
Review 653. 
3 See Stair, I, iv, 9.  As early as 1683 it was being argued before the Court of Session that it 
ZDVHUURUWRFRPSDUHWKH6FRWWLVKKXVEDQG¶VULJKWVZLWKDsocietas or communion bonorum in 
the European sense:  Earl of Leven v Montgomery 0RU%HOO¶VLectures on 
Conveyancing (3rd edn, 1882) vol II at 855 gets to the heart of the matter when he writes: µA 
communion of goods arises by marriage, in which the husband and wife, and their children, if 
any, are jointly interested ...[but] during the marriage [the husband] is, to all intents and 
purposes, proprietor of the whole goods in communion, as regards transactions inter vivos.¶ 
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the husband.4  ,Q UHWXUQ WKH KXVEDQG WRRN RQ OLDELOLW\ IRU KLV ZLIH¶V DQWH-
nuptial debts, as well as an on-going obligation of maintenance (called aliment 
in Scotland).  Secondly, the husband had a ius administrationis, which was his 
right to administer all the property owned by his spouse that did not fall to him 
by dint of the ius mariti, most importantly of course her heritable property.5  So 
even if the married woman was technically owner, she lacked legal control 
over her own property.  $ ZRPDQ¶V DXWRQRP\ ZDV YHU\ Veverely 
FRPSURPLVHGRQPDUULDJHKHUKXVEDQG¶VZDVXQDIIHFWHG 
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century the unquestioned acceptance 
of this state of affairs was being increasingly challenged, though it took fully 
sixty years of legislative development for the effects of the ius mariti and the 
ius administrationis to be removed in their entirety.  The first amelioration of 
WKHZLIH¶VSRVLWLRQFDPHZLWKWKH&RQMXJal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 
1861, which allowed a woman who had obtained a decree of judicial 
separation to retain such property as she acquired subsequent to the decree, 
and also entitled a deserted wife to seek an order from the court which would 
protect her property from the claims of her deserting husband.6  The Married 
:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\6FRWODQG$FW1877 allowed married women to retain their 
own earned income (though judicial interpretation of the Act tended to limit its 
application7).  The most important legislation was, however, the Married 
:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\ 6FRWODQG$FWs of 1881 and 1920, the former abolishing 
the KXVEDQG¶V ius mariti and the latter abolishing his ius administrationis8.  
The 1920 Act also removed the existing common law rule that donations 
between husband and wife were always revocable by the donor.9  From that 
                                            
4 A limited H[FHSWLRQWRWKLVZDVWKHZLIH¶Vµparaphernalia¶, being her clothes, jewellery and 
their receptacles.  She remained absolute owner of these: see F Walton, Husband and Wife 
(3rd edn 1951) at pp 219-221. 
5 $Q\LQFRPHJHQHUDWHGE\PHDQVRIUHQWDQGWKHOLNHIURPDPDUULHGZRPDQ¶VKHULWDEOH
property, being moveable, fell automatically to the husband. 
6 See Turnbull, Petitioner (1864) 2M 402, where the word µdesertion¶ in this context was held 
to bear its natural meaning, wider than that required to give a ground for divorce. 
7 See E Clive The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland (4th edn, 1997) at para 14.010. 
8 An exception to this abolition of the ius administrationis was that the husband remained 
HQWLWOHGWRDGPLQLVWHUKLVZLIH¶VSURSHUW\IRUVRORQJDVVKHZDVLQPLQRULW\7KLVODVWYHVWLJH
of the rule was abolished by s 3 of the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 1984. 
9 0DUULHG:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\6FRWODQG$FWV  This allowed property to be transferred 
from one spouse to the other and so (subject to the normal bankruptcy rules) protect the 
property from the creditors of the former. 
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point a separate property regime probably applied in Scotland to married 
couples.10  For the avoidance of all doubt in the matter, s 24 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985 now provides that, subject to the provisions of that or any 
other enactment, marriage or civil partnership11 shall not of itself affect the 
respective rights of the parties in relation to their property.  So during a 
marriage/civil partnership the ownership of property is (generally speaking) 
unaffected by any domestic relationship the property owner or claimant 
happens to be a party to.  Each party remains separately owner of his or her 
existing property and, subject to minor qualifications,12 it is general property 
law rather than family law that determines ownership of property acquired 
subsequent to entering into a marriage/civil partnership.  Each spouse/civil 
partner is an autonomous individual, owner of their own property and liable for 
their own debts. 
 
Financial Claims on Divorce 
Judicial divorce has been available in Scotland since the Reformation in 
1560,13 originally limited to the matrimonial offences of adultery and 
desertion.14  From then until 1964 divorce was treated as akin to death: the 
innocent spouse received from the estate of the guilty spouse (divorce being 
fault-based throughout that period15) such property as she or he would have 
inherited had the guilty spouse died.16  As such the court had no power to 
                                            
10 7KH0DUULHG:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\6FRWODQG$FWVLPSO\UHPRYHGWKHKXVEDQG¶Vius 
mariti without explicitly putting in place a separate property regime, though in the absence of 
WKHKXVEDQG¶VULJKWWKLVZDVDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\a necessary implication.  But there remained 
room for doubt and the likelihood of unfairness in certain areas such as savings from 
housekeeping allowances: see Anton, (n 2). 
11 Of course, civil partnership, a purely statutory creation, never was subject to common law 
rules.  The addition of civil partnership to the rule in s 24 is designed to ensure that there is no 
possibility of an argument being made that civil partnership and marriage are to be treated 
differently in respect of property ownership. 
12 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, ss 25 and 26: presumption of equal shares in, 
respectively, household goods and savings from housekeeping allowances. 
13 The authority of the Pope in Scotland was abolished by Act of Parliament on 24 August 
1560: APS II, 534, c 2. 
14 Divorce for adultery, seemingly mandated in Matthew 19.9, was accepted immediately, 
while divorce for desertion was introduced by statute in 1573: APS III, 81, c 1 (12mo c 55). 
15 Except that in 1938 incurable insanity was added as a ground, in which case divorce had 
QRHIIHFWRQWKHSDUWLHV¶SURSHUW\ Divorce (Scotland) Act 1938, s 2(1). 
16 Terce and courtesy from heritable property and ius relictae/relicti from moveable property.  
$ZLIH¶VWHUFHZDVDOLIHUHQWRIRQHWKLUGRIWKHKXVEDQG¶VKHULWDEOHSURSHUW\DKXVEDQG¶V
courtesy was a liferent of the ZKROHRIWKHZLIH¶VKHULWDEOHSURSHUW\EXWZDVFODLPDEOHRQO\LI
there was a living child of the marriage who had been heard to cry: Stair II, vi, 19.  Ius relictae 
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award aliment or a periodical allowance, with the result that the wife of a 
property owner was likely to leave her marriage very significantly better 
provided for than the wife of a wage-earner, however high the wage.  The 
Succession (Scotland) Act 1964 separated the rules on death from the rules 
on divorce, and gave the divorce court the power to make such order as it 
thought fit to grant to the pursuer a capital sum or (for the first time) a 
periodical allowance, or both.  The Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, which 
introduced no-fault divorce into Scots law,17 extended the 1964 reforms to 
allow either pursuer or defender to apply for financial provision on divorce, 
irrespective of fault.  This highly discretionary system, usually exercised in 
favour of granting an indefinite periodical allowance, and usually in practice 
requiring an ex-husband to pay that periodical allowance to an ex-wife, was 
swept away by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, and this Act remains the 
basis of the law today.   
 
There have been other developments.  Civil partnership (an institution 
for same-sex couples functionally identical to the institution of marriage for 
opposite-sex couples) was introduced into Scots law by Part III of the Civil 
Partnership Act 2004 (UK), and the 1985 Act was amended so that the 
financial provision on divorce sections apply equally to dissolution of a civil 
partnership18.  The Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 introduced a regime of 
financial provision for separating cohabitants (same-sex and opposite-sex), 
but it is much more limited, and deliberately less valuable, than the regime 
(discussed in the next section) for spouses/civil partners.19  So the choice to 
marry or enter a civil partnership is regarded by the law as a voluntarily made 
FKRLFHWRVXEMHFWRQH¶VSDWULPRQ\WRDKLJKHUOHYHORIFontrol than it would be 
                                                                                                                             
and ius relicti are claims (which may still be made today on the death of a spouse or civil 
partner) for one third or one half (depending upon whether there are surviving issue) of the 
moveable property. 
17 Retaining as alternative grounds for divorce, the fault-based grounds of adultery, 
unreasonable behaviour and desertion.  Desertion was abolished as a ground for divorce by 
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, but divorce today retains both fault grounds (adultery 
and unreasonable behaviour) and non-fault grounds (non-cohabitation, for one year with 
consent or two years without consent). 
18 See Civil Partnership Act 2004, sched 28, part II. 
19 7KHGHWDLOVRIFRKDELWDQWV¶FODLPVDUHRXWZLWKWKHVFRSHRIWKLVFKDSWHU)RUDGLVFXVVLRQ
see K Norrie, Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006: Text and Commentary (Dundee University 
Press, Dundee 2006) at pp 68-72. 
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subjected to through a choice to cohabit with another person in an 
unregistered (though conjugal) relationship.  As we will see, however the 
SDUWLHV¶ SHUVRQDO DXWRQRP\ LV QRW VLJQLILFDQWO\ UHVWULFWHG E\ HLWKHU RI WKH




(II)  The Financial Consequences of Divorce/Dissolution: The Default 
Rules for Spouses/Civil Partners 
 
The Section 9 Principles 
Structurally, as we have seen, Scotland does not have a community property 
regime for married/civilly empartnered couples, though functionally it has 
something very close to what might be described as deferred community 
property (for acquests).  For on divorce/dissolution20 the effect of the financial 
orders that the Scottish court can make is, by and large, the same as the 
effect achieved by a community property regime21.  The available orders are 
listed in s 8 of the 1985 Act, and include orders for the payment of a capital 
sum, for the transfer of property, for the payment of a periodical allowance22 
and for the sharing of interests in a pension scheme.  It is competent to make 
any of these orders only when the order is both (i) justified by one or more of 
five principles laid down in section 9 of the 1985 Act and (ii) reasonable 
having regard to the resources of the parties.  Section 9 is the very heart of 
the 1985 Act: an order cannot be made unless justified, and it cannot be 
justified except by one or more of the principles listed there.  There is no 
direct structural link between the types of order listed in s 8 and the 
justifications for making an order in s 9 though, as we will see, only some of 
the s 9 principles can be used to justify a periodical allowance. 
                                            
20 µDivorce¶ being the legal process by which a valid marriage is brought to an end; 
µdissolution¶ being the process by which either a voidable marriage or a civil partnership is 
brought to an end. 
21 This similarly is explored rather more fully by K Norrie µThe Legal Regulation of Adult 
Domestic Relationships¶ in Mixed Jurisdictions Compared: Private Law in Louisiana and 
Scotland, (EUP, 2009) eds V Palmer and E Reid, pp 146-172, esp at pp 155-156. 
22 It is important to note immediately that µperiodical allRZDQFH¶LVQRWWREHUHJDUGHGDV
precisely analogous to aliment or maintenance.  Maintenance is an award of living expenses, 
but a periodical allowance under the 1985 Act will often have a quite different purpose. 
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The first principle that justifies the court making an order for financial 
provision on divorce/dissolution is that the net value of the 
µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ should be shared fairly between the parties 
to the marriage/civil partnership.23  This is by far the most important, and most 
widely used, of the s 9 principles. 
 
The central concept in this principle is the artificial and statutorily 
delineated µmatrimonial/partnership property¶.  This is given a precise 
definition in s 10(4) of the 1985 Act and is not subject to judicial discretion.24  
Property in Scotland either is or it is not µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ 
µDFTXHVWV¶ LQ WKH WHUPLQRORJ\ RI VRPH RWKHU OHJDO V\VWHPV and if it is not, 
then it is not available for sharing under this first and most powerful of the 
section 9 principles.  µMatrimonial/partnership property¶ means all the property 
belonging to the parties or either of them at the relevant date which was 
acquired by them or him or her (otherwise than by gift or succession from a 
third party) (i) before the marriage/civil partnership for use by them as a family 
home or as furnishings and plenishings for such home or (ii) during the 
marriage/civil partnership but before the µrelevant date¶.  In other words, those 
assets25 that accrue to the parties or either of them between the date of the 
marriage/civil partnership and (basically) the date of separation fall within the 
concept of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶  -  unless gifted by or inherited 
from a third party  -  and their value (but not necessarily themselves) is likely 
to be shared 50-50.  Conversely, property that either party owned before the 
marriage/civil partnership is not available for such sharing, unless it was 
acquired before the marriage/civil partnership for use by the parties as a 
family home or furnishings and plenishings thereof. 26  µProperty¶ for this 
                                            
23 1985 Act, s 9(1)(a). 
24 Attempts by judges in the early years RIWKH$FW¶VRSHUDWLRQWRFODLPDGLVFUHWLRQWRLQFOXGH
or exclude particular types of asset from the definition have not thrived. 
25 An increase in the value of an asset during the marriage/civil partnership is not itself 
matrimonial/partnership property: the concept refers to the asset itself and not its value. 
26 Compare Ranaldi v Ranaldi 1994 SLT (Sh Ct) 25 where a house was not matrimonial 
property, having been purchased as a family home in contemplation of a previous marriage, 
with Mitchell v Mitchell 1995 SLT 426 where a house was matrimonial property, having been 
purchased in contemplation of a previous marriage between the same parties now divorcing 
(again). 
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purpose might include any right or interest in benefits under a pension 
arrangement.  A periodical allowance is never justified by this principle, which 
justifies only the making of an order for the payment of a capital sum, or for 
the transfer of property, or pension splitting. 
 
Fair sharing under this principle is presumed to be equal sharing.27  So 
if party A owns £100,000 worth of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ and party 
B owns £20,000 thereof, this principle will justify an order the effect of which is 
to require the transfer from A to B of cash or assets worth £40,000: that way 
each takes £60,000, which is one half of the total µmatrimonial/partnership 
property¶.  However, the presumption of equal sharing may be departed from 
if the court is persuaded that special circumstances exist that justify sharing in 
different proportions than 50-50: examples are given in s 10(6) of the sorts of 
circumstances that might justify a departure from equal sharing and include 
the terms of any agreement between the parties, the sources of the funds 
used to acquire the property, the nature of the property and the use to which it 
is put.28 
 
Valuation of the property has proved a contentious issue in practice 
though it is now settled that µnet value¶ refers to the price paid and not the 
value received.29  The date of valuation is, generally speaking, the date of 
separation (the so-called µrelevant date¶30) but this was amended31 in relation 
to property transfer orders to be, generally speaking, the date of the order.  
That amendment resolved one of the most controversial aspects of the 
operation of the 1985 Act, arising from the case of Wallis v Wallis:32 when 
valuation is made at the relevant date, an order for the transfer of property 
which had increased in value between the relevant date and the date of the 
court decree would result in the party in whose favour the order was made 
receiving the full increase without having to share that increase with the other.  
                                            
27 1985 Act, s 10(1). 
28 For a full discussion of s 10(6), see K Norrie Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the Laws of 
Scotland: Child and Family Law (Reissue, 2004) at para 662. 
29 Sweeney v Sweeney (No 2) 2005 SLT 1141. 
30 Defined in s 10(3) and (3A). 
31 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 16. 
32 1993 SC(HL) 49.  See also Jacques v Jacques 1997 SC(HL) 20. 
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This was perceived to be particularly pernicious when the property was 
originally jointly owned. 
 
The underlying assumption in s 9(1)(a) is that it is in the very nature of 
marriage/civil partnership that the benefit of acquests must fall to both parties.  
During the effective life of the marriage/civil partnership ownership is not really 
relevant to the enjoyment of the property, but on divorce/dissolution a division 
is needed to guarantee that the benefit continues to accrue to both.  The claim 
for a fair share of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ is a claim almost as of 
right, and it will be applicable in virtually every case.  As Lord McClusky put it: 
 
µJunior counsel ... suggested that the principles listed in s 9(1) as (a), 
(b), (c), (d) and (e) are ³cumulative´.  I should prefer to say that it is the 
duty of the court to apply (a) and also to apply whichever of the other 
specified principles are relevant in the light of the facts of the case¶.33 
 
The second principle that can justify the making of an award of 
financial provision on divorce/dissolution is that fair account should be taken 
of any economic advantage derived by either party from contributions, 
whether financial or otherwise, of the other, and of any economic 
disadvantages suffered by either party in the interests of the other party or of 
the family.34  This is designed to compensate, for example, for the loss of job 
opportunities, which had been given up for the sake of the family, and to 
share the economic benefits that one spouse/civil partner received, such as 
enhanced career opportunities, because the other spouse/civil partner 
relieved him or her of a share of the family burdens.  The aims of this principle 
are (i) to even out the advantages and disadvantages gained or suffered by 
one in the interests of, or for the benefit of, the other or the family, and (ii) to 
recognise the palpable value to families of the non-financial contributions 
made in the form, typically, of housekeeping and childminding.  The 
underlying assumptions of this principle have much in common with, but are 
wider than, those that underpin the law of unjustified enrichment.  A periodical 
                                            
33 Cunniff v Cunniff 1999 SC 537 at 539F-G. 
34 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 9(1)(b). 
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allowance is never justified by this principle, which justifies only the making of 
an order for the payment of a capital sum, or for the transfer of property, or 
pension splitting. 
 
The third principle is that any economic burden of caring for a child of 
the family under 16 should be shared fairly between the parties.35  This allows 
the court to make an order that will share the actual costs of bringing up the 
child: it is frequently used to justify the transfer to the parent who has 
residence of the child the half share of the family home that belonged, before 
divorce/dissolution, to the non-residence parent.  A periodical allowance might 
EHMXVWLILHGE\WKLVSULQFLSOHEXWLWZRXOGWHUPLQDWHRQWKH\RXQJHVWFKLOG¶Vth 
birthday.  The underlying assumption is obvious  -  that both parents have an 
obligation to share the financial responsibilities of bringing up their children 
even when, because of parental separation, the emotional and practical 
responsibilities are very unevenly distributed. 
 
The fourth principle is that a party who has been dependent to a 
substantial degree on the financial support of the other party should be 
awarded such financial provision as is reasonable to enable him or her to 
adjust, over a period of no more than three years, from the date of the decree, 
to the loss of that support by the divorce/dissolution.36  This is primarily 
designed to provide a short-term cushion to persons who have been long out 
of the job market and would therefore require a period of readjustment before 
being able to become fully independent.  This principle will frequently be used 
to justify the awarding of a periodical allowance.  However, it is fundamental 
error to see this principle as one that is designed to provide ongoing 
maintenance or one that focuses on needs.  It has the short-term aim of 
providing time for readjustment, not the long-term provision of a source of 
income.  It misses the whole point of the self-FRQWDLQHGµMXVWLILFDWLRQV¶LQVWR
criticise as ungenerous the three year limitation to the periodical allowance 
that can be made under this principle. 
 
                                            
35 Ibid, s 9(1)(c). 
36 Ibid, s 9(1)(d). 
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The fifth principle is a safety net provision for a party who at the time of 
the divorce/dissolution seems likely to suffer serious financial hardship as a 
result of the divorce/dissolution: it allows the court to make such financial 
provision as is reasonable to relieve the party of that hardship over a 
reasonable period of time.37  Originally this principle was designed for parties 
who might lose out on shares of pensions and the like referable to marriage 
but, though pensions are now more readily accessible through the application 
of s 9(1)(a), this principle remains relevant in cases where there is little in the 
way of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ but one is a high earner and the 
other is not and the differences in lifestyle before and after the 
divorce/dissolution is stark.38 
 
These principles need to be looked at together, and an award under 
one may satisfy the requirements of another: for example a generous award 
under s 9(1)(a) may obviate the need for an award under s 9(1)(b) or (e).  The 
court is looking WRPDNHDQRYHUDOODZDUGWKDWLVµFRKHUHQW¶UDWKHUWKDQDVWKH
(QJOLVKFRXUWVWHQGWRSXWLWRQHWKDWLVµKROLVWLF¶,WZLOOEHQRWLFHGWKDWIDXOW
(in the sense of responsibility for the breakdown of the marriage/civil 
partnership) plays no part in these principles.  It is explicitly provided39 that in 
applying the s 9 principles the court shall not take account of the conduct of 
the parties, unless the conduct has adversely affected the financial resources 
available for distribution or, in relation only to the fourth and fifth principles, it 
would be manifestly inequitable to leave the conduct out of account.  
 
The Family Home 
The family home is often the single most valuable item of 
µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ available for sharing under s 9(1)(a) and is 
usually the most emotionally significant.  However, other than the extension of 
the definition of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ to include property acquired 
before the marriage/civil partnership if acquired for the purpose of being a 
family home for the parties, there are no special rules governing the 
                                            
37 Ibid, s 9(1)(e). 
38 See for example Haughan v Haughan 1996 SLT 321 (OH); 2002 SLT 1349 (IH). 
39 1985 Act, s 11(7). 
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distribution of the family home on divorce/dissolution.  It follows that, if part of 
the µmatrimonial/partnership property¶, the net value of the home will be 
shared (presumptively equally) between the parties.  However, it is very 
common (particularly if there are still children living in the home) for the court 
WRRUGHUWKHWUDQVIHURIRQHSDUW\¶VKDOIVKDUHWRWKHRWKHUeither in satisfaction 
of an entitlement to receive something or, if no net transfer between the 
parties is justified by the section 9 principles, with a compensating transfer of 
an equivalent amount of cash or other property. 
 
Pensions 
It very frequently happens that after the family home, and often even before 
that, the largest single asset of a party whose marriage/civil partnership is 
being brought to an end is the interest he or she has in an occupational 
pension scheme.  Such interests always were within the contemplation of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985,40 and from the start pension funds were 
resources from which a party could be ordered to pay a capital sum.  
Problems in accessing these funds before the pension-KROGHU¶V retirement, 
however, meant that such payment of capital sums as were ordered were 
frequently required to be postponed until the date of retirement, or paid in 
installments.  And even after retirement the contributor's entitlement will often 
be a monthly income rather than a lump sum, making an order to pay a capital 
sum to an ex-spouse unfeasible other than by instalments. 
 
The Pensions Act 1995 introduced into the 1985 Act a new provision,41 
relevant only to orders for financial provision justified by the principle in 
section 9(1)(a), that the matrimonial property should be shared fairly between 
the parties.  If the interest in a pension scheme includes a lump sum, payable 
either on retirement or death of the contributor, the court may make a variety 
of orders requiring the trustees or managers of the scheme to pay over the 
whole or part of this lump sum, when it becomes due, to the non-contributor 
spouse.  These are known as 'earmarking orders', for they earmark a portion 
                                            
40 See 1985 Act, s 10(5), as originally enacted. 
41 1985 Act, s 8(1)(ba) and s 12A. 
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of the lump sum which will go to the non-contributor ex-spouse at the time the 
lump sum becomes due in the normal course of events. 
 
That provision does not apply to the part of the pension from which the 
contributor takes income. That is clearly a valuable µresource¶. Part III of the 
Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced into the 1985 Act the 
power to make a µpension sharing order¶42 under which the whole or part of 
the value of a pension (including that portion which generates income) can be 
transferred to the non-contributor partner, effectively creating two pensions 
out of the single scheme.  The order must be made at or before the date of 
the decree of divorce/dissolution or declarator of nullity.43  The order may be 
justified by any of the principles in section 9(1) and not just that in section 
9(1)(a) of the 1985 Act.44  Pension sharing may also feature as an element in 
a separation agreement, though to be enforceable any such agreement must 
be registered in the Books of Council and Session.45 
 
Maintenance 
It is not and never has been in Scotland one of the underlying assumptions of 
marriage (and now civil partnership) that the parties thereto undertake a life-
long obligation to maintain the other and maintenance, in the sense of 
providing for ongoing alimentary needs, has never been one of the goals of 
the financial provision that the Scottish courts make on the termination of a 
marriage.46  In a system that has had judicial divorce for 450 years, it has long 
been accepted that consent to marriage is the undertaking of an obligation to 
maintain for so long as the marriage lasts, but no longer.  Scots law reflects 
this understanding, and the obligation of aliment, now governed by the first 
seven sections of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, lasts only as long as 
the marriage/civil partnership lasts.  But even then the obligation is not 
absolute and the parties can agree between themselves as to the terms under 
which that obligation is to be met.  However, s 7(1) provides that any provision 
                                            
42 1985 Act, s 8(1)(baa). 
43 1999 Act, s 28(7), (8). 
44 Galloway v Galloway 2003 Fam LB 10. 
45 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999, s 28(3)(b). 
46 Except, in practical terms, for the short historical period between 1964 and 1985. 
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in an agreement that purports to exclude future liability for aliment or to restrict 
the right to bring an action for aliment shall have no effect unless the provision 
was fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the agreement at the time 
it was entered into.  So the agreement can be challenged on the basis that it 
was not fair and reasonable.  These terms are discussed further below.  
Additionally, under s 7(2), an application may be made to the court for 
variation of the amount payable under an agreement, or for the termination of 
the agreement whenever there has been a material change in the 
circumstances.47 
 
This statutory obligation of aliment, and the rules for variation of 
agreements concerning the payment of aliment, do not survive the 
marriage/civil partnership that gives rise to the obligation, and there is no 
ongoing obligation of maintenance after divorce/dissolution.  A periodical 
allowance ordered by the court as part of the financial provision it makes is 
based on the justifications listed in section 9, as discussed above, and not on 
any obligation to maintain or right to be maintained, for none exists except 
between spouses/civil partners and from parents to children.  However, there 
is nothing to prevent the parties undertaking an obligation to pay and receive 
a periodical sum for the purposes of maintaining the payee, either by contract 
or by unilateral promise (fully enforceable in Scots law).  Such an agreement 
may be set aside or varied by the court at any time after granting a decree of 
divorce/dissolution if the agreement expressly provides for the court doing 
so,48 RU RQ WKH SD\HU¶V VHTXHVWUDWLRQ49 or on the making of a maintenance 
calculation by virtue of which child support maintenance becomes payable by 
either party with respect to a child to whom or for whose benefit periodical 
allowance is paid under the agreement.50  A mere change of circumstances, 
such as justifies the court varying an agreement relating to spousal aliment, is 
not sufficient to allow the court to vary a contract, freely undertaken, to pay 
                                            
47 The making of a maintenance calculation in respect of a child to whom or for whose benefit 
aliment is payable under such an agreement is a material change of circumstances for these 
purposes: ibid, s 7(2A). 
48 Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, s 16(1)(a) and (2)(a). 
49 Ibid, s 16(3)(a)-(c). 
50 Ibid, s 16(3)(d), as inserted by the Child Support (Amendments to Primary Legislation) 
(Scotland) Order 1993, SI 1993/660. 
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non-spousal (or post-spousal) maintenance.51  But if the agreement is 
contained in a separation agreement between the parties to the marriage/civil 
partnership to take effect on divorce/dissolution, it may be set aside or varied 
if not fair and reasonable under s 16 of the 1985 Act, as discussed below. 
 
Purpose of the Rules 
The Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 aims to provide a detailed structure 
within which the courts must operate in determining what financial provision to 
make when spouses or civil partners dissolve their legal relationship and have 
been unable to agree themselves as to the division of their property.  Though 
designed to be far less discretionary than the pre-1985 law, a certain level of 
discretion clearly still rests with the court  -  for example in determining a µfair¶ 
sharing of µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ under s 9(1)(a), in assessing 
contributions and disadvantages under s 9(1)(b) and taking µfair account¶ of 
them, and making a µreasonable¶ provision either for adjusting to loss of 
support under s 9(1)(d) or for ameliorating serious financial hardship under s 
9(1)(e).  But the Act does provide a structure within which all courts can 
operate to produce a result that is (to some extent at least) predictable.  
Predictability of judicial outcome is believed to encourage extra-judicial 
settlement, an important social aim of the law.  Another major aim of the 
Scottish legislation on financial provision on divorce/dissolution is to 
encourage the court to design a settlement that ensures a µclean break¶ 
between the parties.  The primary order that the court can make is one for the 
payment of a lump sum or for the transfer of property from one ex-spouse to 
the other: in other words, a once and for all financial settlement, after which 
the parties are to be free of obligation towards  -  and free of dependency on  -   
each other.  The two most valuable assets (the family home and the 
pensions) are normally dealt with through a one-off payment, for the principles 
contained in s 9(1)(a) and (b), which are the primary means of dealing with 
these assets, allow for the making only of an order for the payment of a 
capital sum or for the transfer of property or for a pension sharing order.  
Principles 9(1)(c) and (d), which tend to be supplementary to the primary 
                                            
51 Drummond v Drummond 1995 SC 321. 
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claim under principle 9(1)(a), envisage the making of an order for a periodical 
allowance, but in both cases only for limited periods of time.  Only principle 
9(1)(e) ever justifies an open ended periodical allowance, and that principle, 
as a safety net, has limited application and indeed is seen less and less in the 
law reports as the years have gone by.  The 1985 Act itself steers the court in 
the direction of satisfying all the principles by means of a clean break 
payment: section 13(2) provides that an order for a periodical allowance, even 
where competent, may not be made unless the court is satisfied that an order 
for the payment of a capital sum or for the transfer of property or a pension 
sharing order would be inappropriate or insufficient to satisfy the requirements 
of being reasonable and being justified. 
 
 
III. Pre-Nuptial and Post-Nuptial Agreements 
 
General Enforceability of Marriage Contracts 
Marital agreements, usually referred to in Scotland as µmarriage contracts¶, 
are enforceable under Scots law in the way that other contracts are.52  It is 
nothing to the point that they have been entered into by spouses (or 
prospective spouses53), or that they tend to regulate matters that, absent the 
agreement, the court would be empowered to regulate.  They have never 
been regarded as being contrary to public policy for they far more commonly 
regulated property arrangements during marriage than on its termination and 
were not, therefore, seen as deeds that encouraged divorce, or that 
undermined the essential nature of marriage.  Nor did their often one-sided 
nature pose any difficulties, for Scots law, in sharp distinction to the English 
common law and following a European tradition whereby unilateral promises 
are legally enforceable54, has never worried about the validity of contracts 
                                            
52 Marriage settlements may also take the form of trusts and, if so, are subject to the general 
Scots law of trusts and in particular the rules in the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 and the Trusts 
(Scotland) Act 1961. 
53 In Kibble v. Kibble 2010 Fam. LB 103/3 the Sheriff Principal rejected an argument that an 
agreement between prospHFWLYHVSRXVHVZDVQRWDQDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQ³SDUWLHVWRD
PDUULDJH´DVUHTXLUHGE\VRIWKH)DPLO\/DZ6FRWODQG$FWdiscussed below. 
54 So long, now, as they are in writing: Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 
1(2)(a)(ii). 
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made in the absence of consideration.  Autonomy of the parties, in other 
words, trumps both the property rules on marriage/civil partnership and the 
property distribution rules on divorce/dissolution.  The general position was 
set out by Lord Kincraig in Milne v Milne55: 
 
In my opinion parties may by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the 
court to pronounce upon the pursuer's entitlement to payment of a 
capital sum, where such is applied for in an action for divorce, and if 
they do so, the court must give effect to any such agreement.  It has 
always been the law that notwithstanding statutory provisions 
regulating the rights of parties, they may agree to certain terms, and if 
they do so they must receive effect.  It is different where the court has 
a duty in relation to the interests of other parties affected by a decree of 
divorce VXFK DV FKLOGUHQ RI WKH PDUULDJH« 1R DJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ
the parties on these matters can relieve the court of its obligation.  
Further there may be statutes which expressly provide that no parties 
may contract out of the provisions of the statute. 
 
So marital agreements in Scotland are more than simply one of the 
circumstances to be taken into account on divorce in terms of s 10(6) of the 
1985 Act: they are contracts enforceable in a court of law56 and, insofar as 
they deal with matters that the court would otherwise have jurisdiction over, 
they can effectively oust the jurisdiction of the court.  In Scotland the courts 
have jurisdiction to determine financial provision on divorce/dissolution only 
when the parties, in the exercise of their own autonomy, either do not or 
cannot reach agreement themselves and so one or other of them asks the 
court to make an order which he or she seeks to show is justified by one or 
more of the section 9 principles.  Unenforceable, however, are terms that 
                                            
55 Milne v Milne 1987 SLT 45 at 47.  See also Thomson v Thomson 1982 SLT 521, Elder v 
Elder 1985 SLT 471, Horton v Horton 1992 SLT (Sh Ct) 37. 
56 Indeed, an agreement may be enforceable even after the death of one of the parties:  see 
5HGIHUQ¶V([HFXWRUY5HGIHUQ1996 SLT 900; Lavery v Lavery 2008 Fam LR 46. 
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purport to restrict tKHSDUWLHV¶ULJKWWRVHHNDGLYRUFH57 or a term whereby one 
party agrees to consent to a divorce based on non-cohabitation for one year.58 
 
Decreased Popularity of Marital Contracts in Scotland 
%HIRUH WKHHQDFWPHQW RI WKH 0DUULHG:RPHQ¶V 3URSHUW\ 6FRWODQG Acts, as 
described above, marriage contracts were µwidely used amongst the 
propertied classes¶59 (a relatively small proportion, it should be remembered, 
of the marrying population) as a means of altering or avoiding completely the 
rules then existing that governed the property relationship between the 
spouses  -  and in particular the rules that a married ZRPDQ¶V PRYHDEOH
property fell into the ownership of her husband and that her heritable property 
fell under his administration.  As the right was the husbDQG¶VWKHDQWH-nuptial 
contract normally took the form of a deed granted in his name, renouncing his 
rights.  If the husband were unwilling to grant such a deed, the wife could 
achieve some protection for herself by establishing an ante-nuptial trust in her 
own favour.60  Marriage contracts were also a means by which a more 
sophisticated distribution of assets on divorce could be achieved than was 
provided for by the common law. 
 
But the need to avoid these rules simply evaporated when the rules 
themselves changed and the popularity of marriage contracts has waned.  
The 0DUULHG :RPHQ¶V 3URSHUW\ 6FRWODQG $FWV, by creating a system of 
separate property amongst spouses, removed the major incentive to parties 
contemplating marriage to enter into marital agreements and today such 
agreements, though generally enforceable, are not commonly met with.  Even 
when spouses/civil partners wish to modify the separation of property 
provided for by the law, there is simply no culture in contemporary Scotland of 
                                            
57 Lawson v Macculloch (1797) Mor 6157. 
58 That consent is valid only if given at the time the decree is pronounced and any previously 
given consent may be withdrawn up until that time: Boyle v Boyle 1977 SLT (Notes) 69.  
Without such consent the non-cohabitation must be for at least two years: Divorce (Scotland) 
Act 1976, s 1(2)(e), as amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. 
59 Clive, (n 7) at 17.001. 
60 In %HLWK¶V7UXVWHHVv Beith 1950 SC 66 the Court of Session finally abandoned the rule that 
a wife was incapable of subsequently varying or renouncing her own ante-nuptial trust.  This 
rule was designed for her own protection for renunciation would result in the trust property 
falling under the control of her husband, but the need for that protection disappeared with the 
0DUULHG:RPHQ¶V3URSHUW\6FRWODQG$FWV 
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doing so by means of formal agreement.  Rather, when individual couples 
wish a closer combination of their resources than is provided by the law, or 
who ILQG WKH ODZ¶VVHSDUDWLRQRISURSHUW\ LQFRQYHQLHQWRU LQDSSURSULDWH, they 
can achieve their aims far more easily by means such as joint bank accounts, 
taking title to heritage in joint names, and specifying each other as 
beneficiaries in pension schemes, insurances and wills.  On divorce too the 
default rules for financial provision on divorce/dissolution discussed above 
provide much of the protection in any case that prenuptial agreements are 
primarily designed to ensure.  The general law to a large extent shields the 
capital assets that the parties owned before entering a marriage/civil 
partnership from claims on divorce/dissolution, for the definition of 
µmatrimonial/partnership property¶ excludes virtually all of these capital assets.  
The author of a practitioner textbook61 positively advises against 
recommending clients to enter into marital agreements because (i) the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 1985 creates µa fair and sensible system¶, any departure 
from which may, in due course, become outdated and inappropriate, (ii) 
spouses can provide for each other by other straight-forward means (such as 
those mentioned above), (iii) household goods are presumed to be owned 
equally in any case, and (iv) µit is generally inadvisable to discuss the 
arrangements for the breakdown of a marriage before it has begun or at 
regular intervals during the marriage: this may damage or destroy the trust 
between the parties to the contemplated marriage, or become a recurring 
source of trouble after marriage¶.62 
 
But marital agreements are not completely unknown in Scottish 
practice.  They may be entered into where individual couples have particular 
reasons to do so.  It is not uncommon, for example, for parties to a second or 
subsequent marriage/civil partnership to wish to avoid court involvement in 
their financial affairs after a previous experience in the divorce/dissolution 
court that they perceive as unfair.  And with reconstituted families  -  
increasingly common in Scotland as elsewhere  -  a property owner may seek 
by marriage contract to preference the issue of his first family over any 
                                            
61 G Jamieson, Family Law Agreements (Tottel Publishing, 2005) at p 35. 
62 Ibid. 
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potential claims of his new spouse.  Jamieson suggests that a marital 
agreement might be appropriate if one of the spouses/civil partners is very 
wealthy and giving a generous, but less than 50% share, of his or her property 
would be more than ample for the needs and comforts of the other.63  Clive 
points out that where there is doubt as to which legal system will govern, and 
the parties fear being subjected to µan uncongenial matrimonial property 
regime¶, an agreement as to which legal system is to govern the relationship 
will resolve that doubt and would be given effect in Scotland.64   
 
Setting Aside or Varying Marriage Contracts 
The normal rules of contract apply to marital agreements where they are 
entered into except that on divorce/dissolution a court may make an 
µincidental order¶ in relation to financial provision setting aside or varying any 
term in an ante-nuptial or post-nuptial marriage settlement or in any 
corresponding settlement in respect of a civil partnership.65  Such an order 
needs to satisfy the normal requirements set out in sections 8 and 9 of the 
1985 Act for the making of any order for financial provision, as discussed 
above, and it must not prejudice the existing rights of any third party.66  
Requesting such an incidental order is rare.  The court also has the power to 
set aside or vary any of the terms of an agreement as to the financial 
provision to be made on divorce/dissolution.67  This particular issue arises 
(and has been judicially discussed) much more commonly in relation to 
separation agreements (which are also covered by the rule in s 16 of the 1985 




IV. Separation Agreements 
                                            
63 Ibid. 
64 Clive (n 7) at para 17.016. 6HHDOVRM.HUULJDQµ6HSDUDWLRQ$JUHHPHQWV6XUYLYRUVKLS
'HVWLQDWLRQVDQG6XFFHVVLRQ¶6/71HZVZKRVXJJHVWVWKDWVHSDUDWLRQ
agreements might also be used to evacuate special destinations in title deeds, not otherwise 
achieved under s. 19 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. 
65 1985 Act, s 14(2)(h). 
66 1985 Act, s 15(3). 
67 1985 Act, s 16. 
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The General Enforceability of Separation Agreements 
Unlike pre- and post-nuptial agreements, separation agreements entered 
into by spouses who have decided that their marriage/civil partnership 
should be brought to an end are commonly met with in Scotland.68  The 
motivation for entering such agreements is likely to have less to do with 
dissatisfaction with the default rules for financial provision in the Family 
Law (Scotland) Act 1985, and more to do with the desire to avoid lengthy 
and expensive court proceedings, which invariably add an unhelpfully 
adversarial tone to what is already a tense and unpleasant experience.  
Most family law practitioners will seek to persuade their separating clients 
to reach agreement with their spouse/civil partner, and it is only when 
agreement cannot be reached that the divorce/dissolution court will be 
asked by one or other of the parties to make orders for financial provision 
as well as an order terminating the legal relationship.  Since separation 
agreements in Scotland, like pre- and post-nuptial agreements, are 
governed by the general Scots law of contract (or of unilateral promise) 
there is no special legal definition, nor any particular requirements as to 
form beyond the normal rules of contract, that such an agreement must 
satisfy before being validly constituted.  Though a verbal agreement is 
competent, certain matters commonly dealt with in separation agreements 
require to be writing69 and in any case for evidential reasons an agreement 
in written form is far preferable and, if executed in terms of the 
Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, will be self-evidencing.70   
Most separation agreements are registered in the Books of Council and 
                                            
68 For the purposes of this discussion, µseparation agreement¶ means an agreement between 
parties who have concluded that their relationship should be terminated by divorce/dissolution 
and who wish to regulate the financial consequences of that conclusion themselves rather 
than leaving it to the divorce/disssolution court.  µSeparation agreement¶ may also refer to the 
private regulation of a couple who have decided to separate but not to divorce: it is 
agreements with this latter meaning that Clive discusses in his chapter on µSeparation¶ in 
Husband and Wife. 
69 See Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995, s 1(2). 
70 Section 2 of the 1995 Act provides that a deed is formally valid if it has been subscribed by 
the granter or the parties; section 3 provides that it is self-evidencing if the signature has been 
attested by a single witness. 
 21 
Session71 for preservation and execution, for any deed registered there has 
the force of a decree of the Court of Session.72  This is not a form of judicial 
scrutiny of agreements and far less one of judicial endorsement.  Rather 
the parties are free to enter whatever agreement they wish, one of the 
terms of which will normally be consent to registration in the Books of 
Council and Session  -  and consent, therefore, to enforceability of the 
agreement.  The parties¶ autonomy is not qualified, except as described in 
the next section, by judicial paternalism. 
The term µseparation agreement¶ is a factual one, referring to any 
agreement concluded by the parties to a marriage/civil partnership (existing 
or prospective) governing, inter alia, the financial arrangements in the 
event of their separation  -  this might involve an agreement for the transfer 
of assets, the undertaking of an obligation of maintenance, or the sharing 
of a pension in terms of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999.  
Separation agreements of this sort tend in practice to be negotiated after, 
rather than before, the parties have decided to split up.  They are, again 
like pre- and post-nuptial agreements, enforceable in the normal way,73 at 
least insofar as they deal with financial matters74 and subject only to 
special rules for their variation or setting aside contained in s 16 of the 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985.  Insofar as they deal with maintenance, 
these rules have already been described. 
 
Setting Aside Agreements on Financial Provision 
                                            
71 That is to say the Register of Deeds maintained by the Keeper of the Registers of Scotland 
on behalf of the Court of Session. 
72 See Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland µ3XEOLF5HJLVWHUVDQG5HFRUGV¶
(Reissue) at para 41. 
73 7KLVKDVEHHQWKHFDVHDWOHDVWVLQFH6WDLU¶VInstitutions.  At I, iv, 9 he wrote: µBy private 
pactions the interest in, and division of, the goods of married persons after the dissolution of 
their marriage, may be according to their pleasure, as they agree¶. 
74 Separation agreements are not in practice limited to financial matters and if, for example, 
there are children involved, they will frequently set out the arrangements for the future care of 
and contact with the children: such terms are not enforceable in the normal way and it is open 
to either party to go to court to seek an order under s 11 of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995: 
the terms of the agreement has no bearing on tKHFRXUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHZHOIDUHRIWKH
child. 
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There is, of course, an inconvenient truth in all of this which a strict 
adherence to party autonomy fails to confront  -  that within domestic 
relationships, opposite-sex certainly and same-sex probably, the parties 
are seldom of equivalent economic strengths.  Even when they are, there 
may be disparities in social or psychological strengths that create 
opportunities for exploitation of the weaker and more vulnerable party.  It is 
this high likelihood of a disparity in bargaining power that justifies a 
difference of treatment between separation agreements and normal 
FRPPHUFLDO FRQWUDFWV  7KH ODZ¶V FRQWLQXLQJ SUHIHUHQFH IRU PDUULDJHFLYLO
partnership over cohabitation is revealed by its treating agreements 
between the latter as if they were commercial rather than domestic 
contracts, notwithstanding a likelihood of bargaining power disparity that is 
at least as great as with couples who have formalised their relationship. 
Prior to the 1985 Act, an agreement on the financial provision to be 
made on divorce could not be set aside unless there was evidence of a 
vitiating factor such as error, fraud, undue influence or misrepresentation  -  
in other words the normal contractual rules were applied without 
qualification due to the fact that the agreement had been between 
spouses.75  In addition, an agreement might be rescinded by one party due 
to the material breach of the other.76  These remain the only means of 
setting aside cohabitation contracts.  Section 16 of the Family Law 
(Scotland) Act 1985, however, gives the court a limited additional77 power 
to set aside or vary agreements made between spouses/civil partners on 
the financial provision to be made on their divorce/dissolution.  Section 16 
applies to agreements made either before or after the commencement of 
                                            
75 Other than that the agreement could be held to be frustrated by the later reconciliation of 
the parties: see Davidson v Davidson 1989 SLT 466.  Resumption of cohabitation is strong, 
but not necessarily conclusive, evidence of reconciliation and mutual revocation of the 
agreement: per Sheriff Scott in Methven v Methven 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 117. 
76 See Morrison v Morrison 1999 *UHHQ¶V)DPily Law Bulletin 43/6. 
77 The normal contractual grounds for reduction or recission continue to exist and, sometimes, 
may prove useful: see G Junor, µSeparation Agreements and Common Law Remedies¶ (1998) 
*UHHQ¶V)DPily Law Bulletin 36/2. 
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the 1985 Act,78 and it cannot itself, by a term in the agreement, be 
excluded.79 
The test by which the court may set aside or vary an agreement or 
any term of such an agreement (including those relating to transfer of 
property, capital sums and pension sharing) is that the agreement is shown 
to be not fair and reasonable at the time it was made.80  This is not to be 
interpreted identically to the test in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.81  
µUnfairness¶ and µunreasonableness¶ are two separate bases upon which 
the agreement can be set aside, and it is not necessary for the party 
seeking reduction of the agreement to show that it was both unfair and 
unreasonable.82  µ5HDVRQDEOHQHVV¶ DV DOZD\V LPSOLHV D UDQJH RI
acceptable outcomes and so an agreement is not challengeable solely on 
the ground that the parties might have reached a different, more 
reasonable, agreement.83  The focus of enquiry in most cases has not 
been on the fairness of the outcome (in the way that the English courts 
sHHN µIDLUQHVV¶ LQ GHWHUPLQLQJ DQ DSSURSULDWH ILQDQFLDO SURYLVLRQ RQ
GLYRUFHGLVVROXWLRQ RU µDQFLOODU\ UHOLHI¶ LQ WKHLU recondite terminology) but 
rather on the fairness of the agreement itself and in particular on the 
process that led to the agreement being reached.  So for example all the 
circumstances pertaining to the parties at the time the agreement was 
made are to be taken into account including in particular the nature and 
quality of any legal advice obtained by either party.84   A failure to seek 
legal advice is unlikely on its own to justify the court in setting aside an 
agreement.85  Putting pressure on a spouse/partner to agree may, if 
                                            
78 1985 Act, s 16(5). 
79 1985 Act, s 16(4). 
80 1985 Act, s 16(1)(b). 
81 Gillon v Gillon (No 1) 1994 SLT 978, per Lord Penrose. 
82 Gillon v Gillon (No 3) 1995 SLT 678.  This is the leading case on s 16.  See also Clarkson v 
Clarkson 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 2.  In, however, Hanif v. Hanif *UHHQ¶V)DPLO\/DZ%XOOHWLQ
112/5, Sheriff Holligan doubted that the court could realistically distinguish between 
unfairness and unreasonableness. 
83 In Turner v. Turner 2009 Fam LB 102/7, Sheriff McCulloch held that a reasonable 
agreement would have given the husband less than the actual agreement did, but that was 
insufficient to make the actual agreement unreasonable. 
84 Young v Young (No 2) 1991 SLT 869; Anderson v Anderson 1991 SLT (Sh Ct) 11; Short v 
Short (1994) Family Law Bulletin 10/5; Inglis v Inglis 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 59. 
85 Inglis v Inglis 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 59. 
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severe, render the agreement unfair,86 but giving up a valuable future claim 
in order to achieve an immediate, short-term, goal such as the departure of 
an unwanted spouse from the matrimonial home is not a reaction to 
unwarrantable pressure sufficient to satisfy the test.87  Whether advantage 
has been taken by one party of the other is relevant88 but unequal division 
of assets, even with a great disparity, is not per se evidence of unfairness 
or unreasonableness.89  The omission from the agreement, whether 
through oversight or otherwise, of a significant asset might be sufficient to 
justify the court overturning the agreement,90 as might the failure of one 
party to give full and frank disclosure of his or her financial position.  
Inadvertent misevaluation, if substantial, is likely to render any agreement 
made on the basis of such valuation unreasonable.91  But making a bargain 
that turns out to be bad is not unreasonable: remember the agreement 
needs to be unfair or unreasonable at the time it was made.  So events, for 
example a drop in the value of property, subsequent to the agreement are 
irrelevant to an application to vary or set aside the agreement on the 
ground of unfairness or unreasonableness.92 
The onus is on the party seeking to escape the agreement and, 
generally speaking, the courts in Scotland have been slow to set aside or 
vary agreements on financial provision.  But this reluctance must not be 
allowed to inhibit the effectiveness of s 16.  In Clarkson v Clarkson93 Sheriff 
MacNair said this: 
Whilst I accept that the courts should not be unduly ready to 
overturn agreements reached between parties, equally they should 
                                            
86 In MacDonald v MacDonald (2009) Family Law Bulletin 99/5 (Sheriff Principal Lockhart) the 
agreement was set aside after the wife signed it against the advice of her solicitor, because 
there was ample evidence to show that she had been so bullied by her husband that she was 
afraid not to sign it. 
87 Inglis v Inglis 1999 SLT (Sh Ct) 59 at 62E, per Sheriff Farrell. 
88 See McAfee v McAfee 1990 SCLR 805; Gillon v Gillon (No 3) 1995 SLT 678. 
89 Gillon v Gillon (No 3) 1995 SLT 678.  Here Lord Weir (at 682) concluded that µthe intangible 
value in terms of peace of mind and a sense of security¶ had to be balanced with the disparity 
in the division agreed. 
90 See Worth v Worth 1994 SLT (Sh Ct) 54; McKay v McKay 2006 SLT (Sh Ct) 149; Clarkson 
v Clarkson 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 2. 
91 Clarkson v Clarkson 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 2. 
92 Anderson v Anderson 1989 SCLR 475. 
93 Clarkson v Clarkson 2008 SLT (Sh Ct) 2 at para 13. 
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not construe s 16 so narrowly so as to deny a party the right given to 
him or her by Parliament to have an unfair or unreasonable 
agreement set aside. 
 
The Time for Setting Aside 
An order setting aside or varying an agreement relating to pension sharing 
may be made only on granting the decree of divorce/dissolution and not 
thereafter.94  If the agreement does not contain a term relating to pension 
sharing, it may be set aside or varied on the granting of the decree of 
divorce/dissolution or within such time thereafter as the court granting such 
decree may specify.95  If the matter is not raised at that point the 
agreement becomes unchallengeable thereafter on the statutory basis 
though it will remain challengeable on the more difficult common law 
grounds of error, fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation.  The court 
is entitled to make a finding that the agreement is unfair or unreasonable at 
an earlier point in the process, but it may not act upon that finding by 
actually setting aside or varying the agreement until the decree of 
divorce/dissolution is pronounced.96 
 
 
V Conflict of Laws 
 
In a provision that is not in its terms applicable to civil partnership, Scottish 
legislation sets out rules for the determination of which legal system is to 
apply to queVWLRQVLQUHODWLRQWRWKHULJKWVRIVSRXVHVWRHDFKRWKHU¶VSURSHUW\
moveable and immoveable,97 but these rules are explicitly disapplied µto the 
extent that the spouses agree otherwise¶.98  It follows that spouses (and there 
is no reason not to suppose civil partners also) can agree between 
                                            
94 1985 Act, s 16(2)(c)(i). 
95 1985 Act, s 16(2)(b). 
96 Gillon v Gillon (No 2) 1994 SC 162; MacDonald v MacDonald (2009) Family Law Bulletin 
99/5 (Sheriff Principal Lockhart). 
97 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 39(1) ± (3). 
98 Ibid, s 39(6)(b). 
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themselves which legal system is to govern their property relationship.  At 
present µrights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship¶ are 
excluded from the terms of the Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations.99  So the validity of marital agreements contracted 
abroad (which presumably for this purpose include such agreements entered 
into by civil partners) is governed by the common law.  That provides that 
foreign agreements will be enforceable in Scotland if (i) formally valid either by 
the law of the place of execution or by the proper law of the contract100, that is 
to say the legal system chosen by the parties to govern the agreement101 or, 
failing such choice, the system with the closest connection to the 
agreement102 and (ii) the parties had capacity to enter the contract (though 
there is some doubt as to how that capacity is determined).103  It follows that 
µthe important question of the effect which a marriage contract has in the 
event of divorce is governed by its proper law and not by the law of the 
country in which the divorce is obtained¶.104  It is thought that, even where a 
marital agreement is governed by foreign law, the Scottish court retains the 
power to vary or revoke the agreement under s 16 of the Family Law 





Autonomy of the parties in regulating their own financial affairs is the starting 
point in Scots law and is not significantly affected by the fact that the parties to 
                                            
99 Brought into UK law by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990. 
100 See A Anton with P Beaumont Private International Law (2nd edn, 1990) at 576- 577. 
101 Though no such choice will affect the court in making orders for financial provision under s 
8 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. 
102 See for example *RROG6WXDUW¶V7UVv McPhail 1947 SLT 221. 
103 See Anton with Beaumont, (n 98) at 577-580.  Clive (n 7) at para 17.033 expresses the 
unqualified opinion that capacity to enter into a marriage contract depends on the law of the 
SDUW\¶s domicile at the time it is made. 
104 Clive (n 7) at para 17.032, citing Montgomery v Zarifi 1918 SC(HL) 128. 
105 Section 16(4) of the 1985 Act does not permit the s 16 power to be contracted out of.  This 
must include not only explicit but implicit contracting out, such as by choosing a system of law 
to govern that has no analogous power, and it would be anomalous to adopt any different rule 
for agreements governed by a legal system not chosen but imposed as having the closest 
connection to the agreement.  
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an agreement marry or enter a civil partnership with each other.106  During the 
relationship they remain autonomous individuals, with the power of course to 
limit their own freedom of action by contract or unilateral promise.  On 
divorce/dissolution the rules governing financial provision are truly default 
rules because they apply only when the parties themselves do not or cannot 
agree as to the financial settlement that is to be made.  The primary aims of 
the default rules for financial provision on divorce/dissolution are 
interconnected: clean break, predictability and the encouragement of extra-
judicial settlement.  It is assumed that a predictable system with limited room 
for judicial discretion will enable parties to negotiate what is mutually 
considered a more suitable result with full knowledge of what the courts are 
likely to do if agreement cannot be reached.  Predictability is for this reason 
regarded as more important than the uncertainties of µfairness in the individual 
case¶, being more likely to avoid fraught and contentious disputes.  Inevitably 
this means that the law is rather less flexible than, say, English law when 
faced with an unusual scenario: this is most noticeable in µbig money¶ cases.  
Nevertheless the law is widely regarded by the legal profession in Scotland as 
being satisfactory and eminently workable.  After a quarter of a century of 
operation, and substantial judicial discussion, the Family Law (Scotland) Act 
1985 is familiar and its principles well-embedded into legal practice.  There 
has been little scope for judicial development such as has been seen in the 
higher courts in England, though there is an extensive interpretative 
jurisprudence.107  There have of course been statutory amendments, in 
particular in 1999 bringing in pension sharing,108 and in 2006 qualifying the 
µrelevant date¶ in order to resolve the µWallis conundrum¶.109  But the basic 
principles themselves are generally regarded as robust and sensible. 
                                            
106 It is as well to note here that this is true only during life.  On death Scots law eschews 
autonomy of the testator in favour of protected inheritance rights for spouses/civil partners 
and for issue.  As we have already seen, before 1964 the distribution oIDSHUVRQ¶VHVWDWHZDV
more or less the same whether a conjugal relationship ended by death or by divorce, and 
WKRXJKWKHUHDUHVRPHWLPHVFDOOVWRUHVWRUHWKHOLQNVHH'5HLGµ)URPWKH&UDGOHWRWKH
*UDYH3ROLWLFV)DPLO\DQG,QKHULWDQFH/DZ¶Edinburgh Law Review 391) the approach 
of the Scottish Law Commission in their 2009 Report on Succession (Scot Law Com No 215, 
May 2009) is to keep the two systems well apart. 
107 See K. Norrie, Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia: Child and Family Law (Reissue, 2004) at 
paras 646-675. 
108 Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999. 
109 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s 16. 
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Sometimes there are calls to make Scots law more discretionary or to 
change the balance between flexibility and predictability,110 but the most 
recent substantial reform of Scottish family law111 dealt only with the µrelevant 
date¶ issue and the various consultations that preceded that reform did not 
identify either serious practical problems or professional discontent with the 
operation of the 1985 Act. 
 
All the more surprise, then, that when the House of Lords handed down 
its judgment in the English case of Miller v Miller, McFarlane v McFarlane112, 
the Scottish judge sitting on the Judicial Committee in that case, Lord Hope of 
Craighead, used his speech to call for a review of the Scottish law, believing 
that the fair result achieved by the application of English law in these cases 
could not have been reached in Scotland.  This caused no little consternation 
in Scotland, where there has been no equivalent expression of judicial 
disquiet.113  He based this conclusion, however, on a surprisingly narrow 
reading of the 1985 Act.  His worry focused on the fact that in a case where a 
wealthy spouse has little capital assets Scots law, with its emphasis on capital 
payment, would be unable to make an award of sufficient worth to achieve 
what the circumstances of the case required.  Commentators responded that 
the payment of a capital sum can be postponed, and made in instalments.114  
The Scottish Government have indicated that it is not minded to act upon Lord 
+RSH¶V FDOO IRU UHIRUP.115  This is sensible.  Amending the law to deal with 
those rare cases (like both Miller and McFarlane) where there is a substantial 
surplus of assets over needs and the only unfairness lies in the economic 
disparity between the two does nothing for  -  and risks disrupting  -  the 
generality of cases where the underlying problem is that assets and income 
                                            
110 See for example C Barton and A Bissett-Johnson µFinancial Provision on Divorce in Scots 
Law: Does it Need Reform?¶ 2000 Juridical Review 265; A Bissett-Johnson and B Dempsey, 
µMcFarlane v McFarlane; Miller v Miller: Time for a Review?¶ 2007 Juridical Review 65. 
111 Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. 
112 [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 618. 
113 See E Clive, µFinancial Provision on Divorce¶ (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review 413; K 
Norrie, µClean Break Under Attack¶ (2006) Journal of the Law Society of Scotland July, p 16. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Parliamentary Question S2W-28599, answered by the Deputy Minister of Justice 25 
September 2006, reported in September 2006 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland Online. 
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are insufficient to keep both ex-spouses/partners at the standard of living they 
enjoyed when together.  The concentration in Scotland on assets acquired 
during the marriage/civil partnership obviates the need to make necessarily 
arbitrary distinctions between µlong¶ and µshort¶ marriages/civil partnerships 
and avoids the trap that, for example, English law seems to have fallen into in 
assuming that marriage/civil partnership involves an undertaking to share 
assets and income accruing even after divorce/dissolution.  While it may well 
be true that Mrs McFarlane and Mrs Parlour116 would have received less from 
a Scottish court than they received from the English court, this does not in 
itself make the Scottish system less µfair¶  -  because fairness is not an 
absolute concept and can be judged only in the light of underlying 
conceptions.  The underlying understanding in Scotland is that marriage/civil 
partnership necessarily involves a sharing of wealth generated during the 
marriage/civil partnership, but not during life.  The English courts seem to see 
marriage/civil partnership as involving an undertaking of life-long 
obligations.117  Though socially the differences between Scotland and 
England may be slight in the structures of family life, the underlying 
understanding of what marriage/civil partnership means in the two countries 
must have been affected by the fact that Scotland has had judicial divorce for 
300 years longer than England. 
 
Nor is there discontent at the enforceability of marital agreements, or at 
WKHSDUWLHV¶SRZHUWRH[HUFLVHautonomy by ousting the jurisdiction of the court 
to make orders for financial provision on divorce/dissolution.  The FRXUW¶V
limited power to set aside or vary such agreements is seen as striking an 
appropriate balance between party protection and contractual freedom.  The 
only substantial amendment to the law on marital agreements in Scotland that 
is at all likely in the future is the extension of the protection granted to 
                                            
116 Parlour v Parlour [2005] Fam 171, conjoined in the Court of Appeal with McFarlane v 
McFarlane. 
117 Just as the (Episcopalian) Church of England continues, at least at a formal level, to see 
marriage as a life-long sacrament and is unwilling, unlike the (Presbyterian) Church of 
Scotland, to remarry divorced individuals.  The Princess Royal was able to marry in a Scottish 
church notwithstanding that her ex-husband was still alive; her brother could obtain only a 
blessing from the English church when he (civilly) married a divorced woman with a living ex-
husband. 
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domestic contracts by s 16 of the 1985 Act to cohabiting couples.  But even 
yet, such an extension is not within any existing governmental plans.  
Marriage/civil partnership remains the politically favoured form of family life. 
